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1. SUMMARY: In deciding that student holders of G-4 visas 
are entitled to in-state tuition at the University of Maryland, 
did the CA properly apply strict scrutiny, use pre-emption and - -----irrebuttable presumption analysis, and order retroactive tuition 
~ 
----
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2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: This case has a lengthy 
history, one which includes two previous Supreme Court opinions. 
Resps represent a class of individuals holding G-4 visas who 
attend University of Maryland. They are dependents of foreign 
national --- of the Inter-American Development Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World 
Bank), who, together with their families, are classified as 
J l . . t 1 . '-' d ' G 4 ' 1 . k t nonimmigran a iens an given - visas. Uni e mos --
nonimmigrant aliens, such persons often reside permanently in the 
United States. They are exempt from federal and state income 
taxation on salaries and emoluments paid by the international 
~ 




Resps originally brought this suit in 1975. Maryland, like 
most state universities, charged "out-of-state" students higher 
tuition than "in-state" students. It based this determination on 
the student's showing of domicile, but the policy was phrase~ 
such a way that resps could not establish Maryland domicile ~'t' -- - /~ _ .. . 
w --because they were nanimmigr a ~t aliens. 
~=w= ........,_ -
They challenged~ 
policy in the district court under 42 u.s.c. §1983 on the grounds 
that it denied them due process of law and equal protection and 
that it interfered with federal prerogatives over international 
agreements and immigration in violation of the supremacy clause. 
The District Court (Miller) granted summary judgment on the 
basis of Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). It reasoned that 
the policy created an irrebuttable presumption because it was not 
universally true that resps could not establish Maryland 
domicile. It ordered University officials to permit the students 
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to prove domicile. It did not consider the other bases for 
relief. 
The University president obtained a stay pending appeal. He 
agreed to refund the difference between the "out-of-state" 
tuition and fees the student would actually pay and the "in-
state" tuition and fees they would have paid "but for the stay" 
should the district court's order be "finally affirmed on 
appeal." 
CA4 affirmed without opinion. The University president 
obtained a writ of cert. This Court stated that "[b]ecause 
···•. 
petitioner makes domicile the 'paramount' policy consideration 
and because respondents' contention is that they can be domiciled 
in Maryland but are conclusively presumed to be unable to ao so, 
this case is squarely within Vlandis as limited by Salfi to those 
situations in which a State 'purport[s] to be concerned with 
[domicile,]' but at the same time den[ies] to one seeking to meet 
its test of [domicile] the opportunity to show factors clearly 
bearing on that issue." The Court chose to obtain a possibly 
dispositive authoritative interpretation of state law. It held 
that federal law did not prevent a G-4 nonimmigrant alien from 
establishing domicile and that state law would determine the 
issue. It certified to the Maryland Court of Appeals the 
question of whether Maryland law permitted G-4 nonimmigrant 
aliens to establish Maryland domicile. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist and the Chief Justice dissented, 
explaining that domicile is not the sole criterion on which the 
University determines "in-state" status. The student must first 
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establish status as a U.S. citizen or immigrant alien. The 
reasons for this classification include the desire to equalize 
costs of education between those who pay all state taxes and 
those who do not. Thus, the University has not created an 
irrebuttable presumption. Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647 (1978). 
The Maryland court held that Maryland law did not prohibit /4Jf 
such aliens from establishing Maryland domicile. Toll v. Moreno, 
------------- -397 A. 2d 1009 (1979). 
While the case was pending before the Maryland court, the 
University Board of Regents passed a clarifying resolution. This 
resolution stated in part: 
~
~ "The Board of Regents deems its statutory 
-,~..,......v authority under the laws of Maryland to include 
the power, right, or privilege to adopt a more ,~v restrictive definition of domici l e =for purposes 
. IO-rr- ~ of according in-state status for admissions, 
(_~ 
 
9--( u vf l1f d. 
P 
tuitions, and charge differentials than ma_y_ be 
apE,_liabl~ Ee ~ ll_y or otherwis~ under the 
Maryland common -raw. ~ 
I(, The resolut ~ stified its policy on the basis of cost 
equalization. 
Because of this resolution, this Court supplemented its 
earlier opinion. It recognized that the resolution 
"fundamentally altered the posture of the case" and raised new 
constitutional issues. It noted that "if domicile is not the 
'paramount' policy consideration of the University, this case is 
no longer 'squarely within Vlandis as limited by Salfi.'" It 
remanded the case to the district court "for further 
consideration in light of our opinion and judgment in Elkins, the 
opinion and judgment of the Maryland Court of Appeals in Toll, 
- ~L~1 A, ,u4 r_ ;=,~ ~ -~ 
and the egents' clarifying resolution of June 23, 
1978." Toll v. t1oreno, 441 U.S. 458 (1979). 
Upon remand" ! the district court concluded that this Court's 
second opinion had not removed the irrebuttable presumption issue 
from the case, but had remanded for the district court to decide 
whether the irrebuttable presumption had been removed. It 
further concluded that the resolution in fact altered rather than 
clarified the University's position. It declined to give the 
resolution retroactive effect. Thus, the policy created an 
' 
impermissible irrebuttable presumption prior to the date of the ..... 
resolution~ but not after its issuance. 
The district court next turned to the equal protection 
claims. It rejected petr's contentions that strict scrutiny is 
inappropriate when the discrimination does not affect resident 
aliens, when some aliens are eligible for in-state status, when 
the matter at issue is not a necessity of life, when the 
University policy is consistent with the purposes of the federal 
immigration law, or on the basis of the dissent's language in 
Elkins that "[t]here . would not appear to be any issue of 
suspect class and the University's in-state tuition policy need 
only be shown to be rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest." It described the issue of whether state 
classifications which narrowly discriminate against nonimmigrant 
aliens should be examined under strict scrutiny analysis as a 
novel question of law. In rejecting petr's contentions, it 
relied on Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977), in which the 
Court applied strict scrutiny analysis in striking down a statute 
r 
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that barred certain resident aliens from eligibility for state 
financial assistance for higher education. Nyquist also 
established that the presumably lesser degree of national 
affinity which nonresident aliens possess is not a permissible 
purpose for a State because immigration is entrusted exclusively 
to the federal government. According to the district court, the 
Supreme Court has wrapped both immigrant and nonimmigrant 
resident aliens in the suspect classification blanket because 
they are a "discrete and insular minority." The court also 
concluded that the exception to strict scrutiny of alienage when 
governmental functions are involved does not apply to this case. 
The purposes for petr's policy, including cost equalization, 
affinity to the state, and efficient administration, would 
arguably survive a rational basis analysis, but fail under strict 
scrutiny. 
The di ~trict co~ t rejected resps' argument that the policy 
,,,.r. interfered with international agreements, b~t agreed that it 
~ olated the supremacy clause by enc~oaching upon the exclusive 
federal power over immig ~ation and naturalization. The Court -------------- -
applied strict scrutiny to the question of interference with 
control over immigration and found that the policy failed to meet 
the burden for the reasons previously set forth. 
The district court affirmed its order enjoining the 
University president from enforcing the in-state status policy as 
applied to resps and directed him to permit the students to 
demonstrate Maryland domicile. It also ordered the president, 
pursuant to the agreement entered at the time of the stay, to 
- --7-
refund the difference in tuition and fees between in and out of 
state tuition and fees. 
The CA affirmed the due process, equal protection, and ..... .._ ---- ,,,,,.,... 
supremacy clause issues for the reasons stated by the district 
court. It rejected the State's argument that the refund violated 
the Eleventh Amendment because the state waived its Eleventh 
Amendment immunity when it obtained the stay. The change in the 
posture of the case resulting from the University's policy 
resolution did not provide a basis for excuse of the obligation 
to refund fee differentials. The district court had continuing 
jurisdiction over the suit because it expressly did not resolve 
all the issues in the litigation in its original order. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr argues that strict scrutiny in this 
case extended the alien/suspect class doctrine beyond the 
reasonable bounds of any decision of this Court and conflicts 
with the views of other courts and commentators. The decision, 
if allowed to stand, would permit all categories of 
nonimmigrants, including foreign students, to be eligible for in-
state benefits. In every case in which this Court has applied 
the strict scrutiny standard to review a state classification 
affecting aliens, the challenged statue or practice discriminated 
against permanent resident aliens. The lower courts in the 
instant case erroneously included nonimmigrant aliens within the 
category of resident aliens. Resident aliens pay taxes and may 
be called into the armed forces. Nonimrnigrant aliens do not 
exhibit such similarities to citizens. Moreover, so many aliens 
are elibile for in-state status at the University that it is 
- --8-
irrational to contend that the in-state policy denies its 
benefits on the basis of alienage. In-state tuition is not a 
necessity of life, and, as the Chief Justice noted in Foley v. 
Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295 (1978), all of the Court's cases 
applying strict scrutiny in this area have involved such 
necessities. Strict scrutiny is not appropriate when the state 
scheme is consistent with federal immigration law. The two 
members of the Court who dissented in the Elkins opinion 
indicated that the rational relation test is the appropriate one 
for this case. 
The court's supremacy clause decision intruded into the area 
of state regulation, for the same reasons that only rational 
relation analysis is appropriate. The decision below fashioned a 
rule automatically invalidating on supremacy clause grounds every 
asserted discrimination against an alien subclass. It wrongly 
suggests that a supremacy clause violation can be justified upon 
the showing of a compelling interest. Moreover, this regulation 
has no impact on immigration. 
The lower courts' use of the irrebuttable presumption 
refused to give effect to this Court's decision and embraced a 
constitutional doctrine disfavored by this Court. "Toll left no 
room for the lower courts to conclude that the district court's 
1976 opinion any longer governed •••• If this Court wanted to 
reach that result, it would have affirmed the 1977 ~ curiam 
opinion of the court of appeals, or dismissed the writ of 
certiorari as improvidently granted." The Court instead 




That no irrebuttable presumption exists was the law of the case 
and not subject to reexamination by the lower courts. It is 
inconsistent to draw a constitutional difference on the basis of 
the University resolution. 
To deny review in this case, after it has acquired a history 
among courts and commentators, would be an open invitation to 
judges to begin reapplying the disfavored irrebuttable 
presumption docrine. Review is necessary to avoid lower court 
confusion on the condition of the irrebuttable presumption 
doctrine. 
When this Court vacated the first court of appeals opinion 
and remanded to the district court, it vacated the earlier order 
of the district court. The old order was a nullity and the 
state's waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity was ended. The 
terms under which refunds were to be available under the stay 
order were not met. 
Forty-four states have filed a brief as amici curiae. They 
express concern about application of the irrebuttable presumption 
doetine, noting that the Court has declined every invitation to 
apply the doctrine to invalidate rationally-based classifications 
not affecting fundamental liberties. Most courts have announced 
the death-knell of the doctrine. See ~.g., Sakol v. 
y 
Commissioner, 574 F.2d 694 (CA2 1978). In rejecting the cost-
equalization basis for the policy, the lower courts impermissibly 
chose between primary and secondary rationales for a governmental 
classification. Finding an irrebuttable presumption only prior 




and practice. This case offers the Court an opportunity to 
overrule Vlandis. 
The application of suspect class analysis to nonimmigrant 
aliens would result in financial hardship for many public ~ 
universities and colleges. The lower courts failed to recognize 
that Mauclet involved resident aliens, who are obligated to pay 
their full share of the taxes that support the assistance 
programs. Under the lower courts decisions, large numbers of 
nonimmigrant aliens may qualify for in-state tuition. The courts 
are divided on the question of whether individual categories of 
nonimmigrants can acquire a domicile in the United States. 
The American Council on Education, the National Association 
of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, The American 
Association of State Colleges and Universities, and the American 
Association of Community and Junior Colleges have also filed an 
amicus brief expressing the same concerns. 
Resps assert that the lower cour 4 s 1 holding that the 
' ....;,.,- . 
University's policy Violates t~e equal protection clause is based 
on established precedent. State classifications based on 
alienage are inherently suspect. The University policy on its 
face treats a sub-class of aliens differently from citizens and 
immigrant aliens. The classification is between two kinds of 
Maryland domiciliaries: citizens and immigrant aliens on one 
hand and nonimmigrant aliens on the other. Mauclet requires 
strict scrutiny in such a case. In addition, the decision 
affects only the relatively few nonimmigrant aliens who can be 




The supremacy clause holding does not present a substantial 
question warranting review. The courts below merely applied the 
standard of Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572. 
Moreover, because the supremacy clause holding was an additional 
ground for the same result, it does not raise a significant 
issue. 
Because the irrebuttable presumption analysis was limited to 
a two-year period, it does not warrant this Court's review. 
Moreover, Elkins made clear that Vlandis squarely governed this 
case. Toll did not remove the issue. 
The Eleventh Amendment issue turns on the construction of 
representation made by the University to obtain a stay of the 
original 1976 order and thus presents no question of general 
significance meriting review by this Court. 
4. DISCUSSION: Because this case has already produced two 
opinions from the Court and because of the importance of the 
questions presented, I would recommend a grant. The Eleventh 
Amendment issue is so fact-specific that it could, I think, be 
eliminated, unless the Court -~ishes to offer guidance on the 
effect of its Vgcating a CA opinion and remanding to the 
district court. The ~ premacy clause issue, · a~ an alternate 
"-'1,,,-, ~ 
holding, may also not merit review. The apparent confusion over 
-
the due process and equal protection issues do, however, seem to 
-------------.t 
call for thts Court's attention. The parties agree that the 
alienage cases pending before the Court, Cabel v. Chavez-Salido, 
No. 80-990, cert granted, 101 S.Ct. 1511, and Plyler v. Doe, No. 
• I 
, . - --12-
80-1538, cert granted, 101 s.ct. 2044, will not resolve the 
issues here. 
There is a response. 
August 29, 1981 Aprill Op. in app. to petn. 
J, 
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Holders of G-4 visas are non-f±mmiQran t aliens who do not 
pay taxes. Typically, they are children of foreign nationals 
- I 
employed by, , e.g .. , World Bank • 
....,_ C 
✓ 
The last time this case was here, Elkins v. Moreno, 435 
' U.S. 647 {1977), the -Univ. of Md. had a rule ~hat only those 
~ 
domiciled in Md. could get in-state tuition rates. This was based 
-solely on the Univ.'s understanding of state "domicile" law and not 
on any policy regarding the propriety of giving holders of G-4 visas 
in-state - tuition. This Court noted that the holder of a G-4 visa 
can, under federal immigration law, intend to remain in this country 
I 
. 
indefinitely {unlike other visa holders who cannot, by definition, 
have an intent to stay). The Univ. policy was challenged as an w~ 
~ 
irrebutable presumption, and the Court remanded to certify to the )tn'\.--~ 
Md. courts the question whether a G-4 visa holder could have a Md. ~ 
domicle. 
The Md. courts held they could. -=---
Md. 425, 397 A. 2d 1009 {1979) • 






• ,, . 
' .. . 
I, 
- - 2. 
Meanwile, on June 23, 1978, the Univ. changed its policy 
and said that it would not give G-4 visa holders in-state tuition 
rates regardless of the meaning of domicile under Md. law. The new 
policy was based on a desir e to give in-state rates only to a group . 
with a closer nexus to the state and more likely to benefit it 
economically in the future than the G-4 group . 
The courcs . below held that prior to the policy change, th -·-
Univ. had an irrebuttable presumption, thus violating due process, 
--..✓,) -and that after the policy change, the Univ. violated the equal-
protection and supremacy clauses. The State was ordered to refund 
tuition "over-charges" because it had waived the eleventh amendment 
earlier in these proceed,i.ngs. 
The eleventh-amendment issue is probably not certworty 
because it depends of the meaning of a specific waiver made in this 
litigation. The other issues do appear certworthy. The Court 
considered the irrebutable presumption claim certworthy when it 
granted Moreno. The lower courts erred in their equal-protection l 
and supremacy-clause analysis, basing both on strict scrutiny. 
, 
The strongest argument in support of the lower courts' 
outcome would probably be on the basis of the supremacy clause, but, 
even if adopted, it would not resemble the rationale below. Given 
the past history of this case (having already been before this Court 
on one occaision) and the interest it has aroused among 
commentators, a denial of cert would probably be interpreted as 
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Motion of American Council 
on Education, et al. for Leave 
to File a Brief as Amici Curiae 
MORENO, et al. CA 4 
1/ 
SUMMARY: Four nonprofit ·organizations- move to file an ami cus 
brief in support of the petn for cert. Petrs have consented to the 
2/ 
filing; resps have not.-
CONTENTIONS: As the nation's principal associations of colleges 
and universities, the movants urge that they are especially qualified 
1/American Council ori Education (ACE), National Assoc. of State 
Universities and Land-Grant Colleges (NASULGC), American Association 
of State Colleges and Universities (AASCU), and American Association 
of Community and Junior Colleges (AACJC). 
2/One ·of the organizations, ACE had appeared with the consent 
of both parties when the case was first before this Court. Elkins v. 
Moreno, 435 U.S. 647 (1978). 
f"-- ~ ,~ ~ '{(Jl,,._ VJ-, \>~ qra...--:,1- ~ (fv-
0 ft CL cf_o -f-et_ h_ I I-, ~ t'5 ' Tr ~ c:,,, rtUi ~ "'tt> :f ('a,,,;:;J ~~ IUO ,'of/} 
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r's "'- d I-- ,-,,_ d, ',,e,R lo '7 ~ eerf, rr /,. "-f S </tu_ ce-,-f pe 4, 







~ - -- 2 -
to speak to the issues presented in this case .. - In particular 
they claim that in a time· of pressing financial crises it is essen-
tial to "preserve rational systems of according preferential 
tuition rates, fees, and admission to · in-state students". such as 
those in effect at the University of Maryland (petrs). 
/ 
They further 
urge this Court to reverse the CA 4's decision and overrule 
Vlahdis v. · Klihe, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). (State school may not deny 
students opportunity to show that they are bona-fide in-state 
residents.) 
DISCUSSION: As organizations whose memberships include most 
of the nation's publicly-supported universities and colleges, 
these movants have a direct interest in this litigation and can 
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Re: No. 80-2178 Toll v. Moreno 
Dear Chief: 
March 9, 1982 
I will be happy to undertake a dissent in this case. 
The Chief Jus t ice 












From: Justice Brennan 
Circulated: ... 15 1982 
Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 8~2178 
JOHNS. TOLL, PRESIDENT, UNIVERSITY OF MARY-
LAND ET AL., PETITIONERS, v. JUAN CARLOS 
MORENO ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
[April -, 1982) 
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The State-operated University of Maryland grants pref-
erential treatment for purposes of tuition and fees to stu-
dents with "in-state" status. Although citizens and immi-
grant aliens may obtain in-state status upon a showing of 
domicile within the State, nonimmigrant aliens, even if domi-
ciled, are not eligible for such status. The question in this 
case is whether the University's in-state policy is invalid 
under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, insofar as 
the policy categorically denies in-state status to domiciled 
nonimmigrant aliens who hold G-4 visas. 
I 
The factual and procedural background of this case, which 
has prompted two prior decisions of this Court, requires 
some elaboration. The focus of the controversy has been a 
policy adopted by the University in 1973 governing the eligi-
bility of students for in-state status with respect to admission 
and fees. The policy provides in relevant part: 
"1. It is the policy of the University of Maryland to 
grant in-state status for admission, tuition and charge-
differential purposes to United States citizens, and to 
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immigrant aliens lawfully admitted for permanent resi-
dence in accordance with the laws of the United States, 
in the following cases: 
"a. Where a student is financially dependent upon a 
parent, parents, or spouse domiciled in Maryland for at 
least six consecutive months prior to the last day avail-
able for registration for the forthcoming semester. 
"b. Where a student is financially independent for at 
. least the preceding twelve months, and provided the stu-
dent has maintained his domicile in Maryland for at least 
six consecutive months immediately prior to the last day 
available for registration for the forthcoming semester." 
App. to Pet. for Cert. 167a-168a. 
In 1975, when this action was filed, respondents Juan Car-
los Moreno, Juan Pablo Otero, and Clare B. Hogg were stu-
·a ents at the University of Maryland. Each resided with, 
and was financially dependent on, a parent who was a nonim-
migrant alien holding a "G--4" visa. Such visas are issued to 
nonimmigrant aliens who are officers or employees of certain 
international organizations, and to members of their immedi-
ate families. 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(15)(G)(iv). 1 Despite re-
spondents' residence in the State, the University denied 
them in-state status pursuant to its policy of excluding all 
nonimmigrant aliens. Seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief, the three respondents filed a class action against the 
University of Maryland and its President. 2 They contended 
1 The international organizations covered by the provision are those that 
are entitled to enjoy the privileges, exemptions, and immunities conferred 
under the International Organizations Immunities Act, 59 Stat. 669, 22 
U. S. C. § 288 et seq. At the time suit was brought, the named plaintiffs 
in this case were dependents of employees of either the Inter-American 
Development Bank or the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (World Bank). 
2 A fourth individual, Rene Otero, Jr., a respondent in this Court, was 
made a named plaintiff in 1980 when a supplemental complaint was filed. 
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that the University's policy violated various federal laws, the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the Supremacy Clause. 
The District Court granted partial summary judgment in 
favor of the three named plaintiffs and the class of G--4 visa-
holders represented by them. 3 In the view of the District 
Court, the University's denial of in-state status to these 
plaintiffs rested upon an irrebutable presumption that a G--4 
alien cannot establish Maryland domicile. Concluding that 
the presumption was "not universally true" as a matter of ei-
ther federal or Maryland law, the District Court held that 
under Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441 (1973), the in-state pol-
icy violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Moreno v. University of Maryland, 420 F. 
Supp. 541, 559 (Md. 1976). Accordingly, in an order dated 
July 13, 1976, the District Court enjoined the President of 
the University 4 from denying respondents the opportunity 
to establish in-state status solely on the basis of an 
"irrebutable presumption of non-domicile." 420 F. Supp., at 
565. 5 The court stayed its order pending appeal in reliance 
on the University's representation that it would make appro-
priate refunds "in the event the Court's Order of July 13, 
3 The court certified a class of G-4 visaholders or their dependents who, 
"residing in Maryland, . .. are current students at the University of Mary-
land, or . . . chose not to apply to the University of Maryland because of 
the challenged policies but would now be interested in attending if given an 
opportunity to establish 'in-state' status, or . . . are currently students in 
senior high schools in Maryland. " Moreno v. University of Maryland, 420 
F. Supp. 541, 563 (Md. 1976). 
' Citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), the District Court dis-
missed the claim against the University itself. 420 F . Supp. , at 548-550. 
The plaintiffs did not appeal that dismissal. 
•The District Court did not order the University to grant the named 
plaintiffs in-state status. Rather, it merely barred the University from 
denying them and the members of the class "the opportunity to demon-
strate that they or any of them are entitled to 'in-state' status for purposes 
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1976, were finally affirmed on appeal." App. to Pet. for 
Cert. 100a. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit af-
firmed, adopting the reasoning of the District Court. Id., at 
102a. 6 
We reviewed the case on writ of certiorari. Elkins v. Mo-
reno, 435 U. S. 647 (1978). We held that "[b]ecause peti-
tioner makes domicile the 'paramount' policy consideration 
and because respondents' contention is that they can be domi-
ciled in Maryland but are conclusively presumed to be unable 
to do so, this case is squarely within Vlandis as limited by 
[Weinberger v.] Salfi, (422 U. S. 749 (1975)]." 435 U. S., at 
660. 7 It was therefore necessary to decide whether the pre-
sumption was universally true. With respect to federal law, 
we concluded that G-4 visaholders could "adopt the United 
States as their domicile." Id., at 666. 8 We were thus left 
with the "potentially dispositive" question whether G-4 
aliens are as a matter of state law incapable of becoming 
domiciliaries of Maryland. We certified this question to the 
Maryland Court of Appeals. 9 The state court answered the 
certified question in the negative, advising us that "nothing 
6 The Court of Appeals stayed its mandate "on the same terms as the 
district court originally granted its stay." App. to Pet. for Cert. 
103a-104a. 
1 Salfi limited Vlandis "to those situations in which a State 'purport[s] to 
be concerned with [domicile, but] at the same time den[ies] to one seeking 
to meet its test of [domicile] the opportunity to show factors clearly bearing 
on that issue."' Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U. S. 647, 660 (1978), quoting 
Weinberger v. Salfi , 422 U. S. 749, 771 (1975). 
8 We noted that as to some categories of nonimmigrant aliens, Congress 
had "expressly conditioned admission . . . on an intent not to abandon a for-
eign residence or, by implication, on an intent not to seek domicile in the 
United States." 435 U. S., at 665. See, e.g., 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(15)(B), 
(F), (H). With respect to G-4 nonimmigrant aliens, however, we con-
cluded that Congress had deliberately declined to "impose restrictions on 
intent," thereby permitting them to "adopt the United States as their do-
micile." 435 U. S., at 666. 
9 The certified question was phrased as follows: 
"Are persons residing in Maryland who hold or are named in a visa under 8 
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in the general Maryland law of domicile renders G-4 visa 
holders, or their dependents, incapable of becoming domi-
ciled in this State." Toll v. Moreno, 284 Md. 425, 444, 397 
A. 2d 1009, 1019 (1979). 
After our certification, but before the state court's re-
sponse, the University adopted a "clarifying resolution" con-
cerning its in-state policy. 10 By its terms the resolution did 
not offer a new definition of "in-state" students; rather, it 
purported to "reaffirm" the existing policy. 11 The resolution 
indicated, however, that the University's policy, "insofar as 
it denies in-state status to nonimmigrant aliens, serves a 
number of substantial purposes and interests, whether or not 
it conforms to the generally or otherwise applicable definition 
of domicile under the Maryland common law." App. to Pet. 
for Cert. 173a. The interests assertedly served by the pol-
icy were described in the following terms: 
"(a) limiting the University's expenditures by grant-
ing a higher subsidy toward the expenses of providing 
educational services to that class of persons who, as a 
class, are more likely to have a close affinity to the State 
and to contribute more to its economic well-being; 
"(b) achieving equalization between the affected 
classes of the expenses of providing educational services; 
U. S. C. § 1101(a)(15)(G)(iv) (1976 ed.), or who are financially dependent 
upon a person holding or named in such a visa, incapable as a matter of 
state law of becoming domiciliaries of Maryland?" 435 U. S., at 668-669. 
10 It was entitled "A Resolution Clarifying the Purposes, Meaning, and 
Application of the Policy of the University of Maryland for Determination 
of In-State Status for Admission, Tuition, and Charge-Differential Pur-
poses, Insofar as It Denies In-State Status to Nonimmigrant Aliens." 
App. to Pet. for Cert. 172a. 
11 "Reaffirmation of In-State Policy. Regardless of whether or not the 
policy approved by the Board of Regents on September 21, 1973, conforms 
with the generally or otherwise applicable definition of domicile under the 
Maryland common law, the Board of Regents reaffirms that policy .. .. " 
Id., at 174a. 
6 
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"(c) efficiently administering the University's in-state 
determination and appeals process; and 
"(d) preventing disparate treatment among categories 
of nonimmigrants with respect to admissions, tuition, 
and charge-differentials." Id., at 17 4a. 
Following the Maryland Court of Appeals' decision, the 
case returned to this Court. But we declined to restore the 
case to the active docket for full briefing and argument, con-
cluding that the University's clarifying resolution had "funda-
mentally altered the posture of the case." Toll v. Moreno, 
441 U. S. 458, 461 (1979) (per curiam). We noted that "if 
domicile [ was] not the 'paramount' policy consideration of the 
University, this case [was] no longer 'squarely within 
Vlandis as limited by Salfi,"' and thus raised "new issues of 
constitutional law which should be addressed in the first in-
stance by the District Court." Id., at 461-462, quoting 
Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U. S., at 660. 12 Accordingly, we va-
cated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded 
the case "to the District Court for further consideration in 
light of our opinion and judgment in Elkins, the opinion and 
judgment of the Maryland Court of Appeals in Toll, and the 
Board of Regents' clarifying resolution of June 23, 1978." 
441 U. S., at 462. 
On remand, the District Court determined that the clarify-
ing resolution constituted a change in the University's posi-
tion. Before that resolution, the University's primary con-
cern had in fact been domicile; after the resolution, domicile 
12 We further noted: 
"Our decision in Elkins rests on the premise that 'the University appar-
ently has no interest in continuing to deny in-state status to G-4 aliens as a 
class if they can become Maryland domiciliaries since it has indicated both 
here and in the District Court that it would redraft its policy "to 
accomodate" G-4 aliens were the Maryland courts to hold that G-4 aliens 
can' acquire such domicile. 435 U. S. , at 661. After the clarifying resolu-
tion, this premise no longer appears to be true. " 441 U. S. , at 461. 
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was no longer "the paramount consideration in the Universi-
ty's policy." 480 F. Supp. 1116, 1124 (Md. 1979). Thus, 
with respect to the period preceding the issuance of the reso-
lution, the District Court reaffirmed its earlier determination 
that insofar as the policy precluded G-4 aliens (or their de-
pendents) from acquiring in-state status, it denied due proc-
ess under Vlandis. 480 F. Supp., at 112~1125. With re-
spect to the period following the promulgation of the 
resolution, however, the court held that Vlandis did not con-
trol: The University had abandoned its position that G-4 
aliens could not establish domicile in Maryland. Id., at 1125. 
Nevertheless, the District Court concluded that the revised 
in-state policy was constitutionally infirm, basing its conclu-
sion on two alternative grounds. First, the court held that 
the policy ran afoul of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. According to the court, the chal-
lenged portion of the University's policy contained a classifi-
cation based on alienage, requiring strict scrutiny, an analy-
sis which the policy did not survive, since the policy did not 
further any compelling interest. 489 F. Supp. 658, 660-667 
(1980). Alternatively, the court held that the in-state policy 
violated the Supremacy Clause by encroaching upon Con-
gress' prerogatives with respect to the regulation of immigra-
tion. Id., at 667-668. 13 
The Court of Appeals affirmed for "reasons sufficiently 
stated" by the District Court. Moreno v. University of 
Maryland, 645 F. 2d 217, 220 (1981) (per curiam). We 
granted certiorari. -- U. S. --(1981). For the reasons 
that follow, we hold that the University of Maryland's in-
state policy, as applied to G-4 aliens and their dependents, 
13 The District Court's preemption holding rested in part on its equal pro-
tection analysis; according to the court, "the standard utilized to uphold a 
state regulation dealing with benefits to be accorded to aliens is essentially 
the strict scrutiny analysis" of equal protection. 489 F. Supp., at 668. 
8 
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violates the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, 14 and on 
that ground affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
We therefore have no occasion to address the question 
whether the policy violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
II 
Our cases have long recognized the preeminent role of the 
Federal Government with respect to the regulation of aliens 
within our borders. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 
67 (1976); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 377-380 
(1971); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U. S. 410, 
418-420 (1948); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 62-68 
(1941); Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 42 (1915). Federal au-
thority to regulate the status of aliens derives from various 
sources, including the Federal Government's power "[to] es-
tablish [a] uniform Rule of Naturalization," U. S. Const., 
Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, its power "[t]o regulate Commerce with for-
eign Nations", id., cl. 3, and its broad authority over foreign 
affairs, see United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 
299 U. S. 304, 318 (1936); Mathews v. Diaz, supra, at 81, 
n. 17; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580, 58~589 
(1952). 
Not surprisingly, therefore, our cases have also been at 
pains to note the substantial limitations upon the authority of 
the States in making classifications based upon alienage. In 
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, supra, we considered a 
California statute that precluded aliens who were "ineligible 
for citizenship under federal law" from obtaining commercial 
fishing licenses, even though they "met all other state re-
quirements" and were lawful inhabitants of the State. 334 
1
• "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in 
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." 
Art. VI , cl. 2. 
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U. S., at 414. 15 In seeking to defend the statute, the State 
argued that it had "simply followed the Federal Govern-
ment's lead" in classifying certain persons as "ineligible for 
citizenship." Id., at 418. We rejected the argument, 
stressing the delicate nature of the federal-state relationship 
in regulating aliens: 
"The Federal Government has broad constitutional pow-
ers in determining what aliens shall be admitted to the 
United States, the period they may remain, regulation of 
their conduct before naturalization, and the terms and 
conditions of their naturalization. Under the Constitu-
tion the states are granted no such powers; they can nei-
ther add to nor take from the conditions lawfully im-
posed by Congress upon admission, naturalization and 
residence of aliens in the United States or the several 
states. State laws which impose discriminatory bur-
dens upon the entrance or residence of aliens lawfully 
within the United States conflict with this con-
stitutionally derived federal power to regulate immigra-
tion, and have accordingly been held invalid." Id., at 
419 (emphasis added) (citation and footnote omitted). 16 
The decision in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 
(1971), followed directly from Takahashi. In Graham we 
15 At the time Takahashi was decided, federal law "permitted Japanese 
and certain other non-white racial groups to enter and reside in the coun-
try, but ... made them ineligible for United States citizenship." 334 
U. S., at 412. 
16 While preemption played a significant role in the Court's analysis , the 
actual basis for invalidation of the California statute was apparently the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. Commentators have noted, 
however, that many of the Court's decisions concerning alienage classifica-
tions, such as Takahashi, are better explained in preemption than equal 
protection terms. See, e. g., Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Concep-
tualization and Appraisal, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1023, 1060-1065 (1979); Note, 
The Equal Treatment of Aliens: Preemption or Equal Treatment?, 31 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1069 (1979). 
10 
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held that a State may not withhold welfare benefits from resi-
dent aliens "merely because of their alienage." Id., at 378. 
Such discrimination, the Court concluded, would violate not 
only the Equal Protection Clause, but would also encroach 
upon federal authority over lawfully admitted aliens. In 
support of the latter conclusion, the Court noted that Con-
gress had "not seen fit to impose any burden or restriction on 
aliens who become indigent after their entry into the United 
States," id., at 377, but rather had chosen to afford "lawfully 
admitted resident aliens . . . the full and equal benefit of all 
state laws for the security of persons and property," id., at 
378. The States had thus imposed an "auxiliary [burden] 
upon the entrance or residence of aliens" that was never con-
templated by Congress. / d., at 379. 
Read together, Takahashi and Graham stand for the broad 
principle 11 that "state regulation not congressionally sanc-
tioned that discriminates against aliens lawfully admitted to 
the country is impermissible if it imposes additional burdens 
not contemplated by Congress." De Canas v. Bica, 424 
U. S. 351, 358, n. 6 (1976). 18 To be sure, when Congress has 
done nothing more than permit a class of aliens to enter the 
country temporarily, the proper application of the principle is 
likely to be a matter of some dispute. But the instant case 
does not present such a situation, and there can be little 
11 Our cases do recognize, however, that a State, in the course of defining 
its political community, may, in appropriate circumstances, limit the par-
ticipation of non citizens in the States' political and governmental functions. 
See, e. g., Gabel v. Chavez-Salido, -- U. S. -- (1982); Ambach v. 
Norwick , 441 U. S. 68, 72-75 (1979); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U. S. 291, 
295-296 (1978); Sugarman v. Dougall , 413 U. S. 634, 64&-649 (1973). 
18 In De Canas , we considered whether a California statute making it un-
lawful in some circumstances to employ illegal aliens was invalid under the 
Supremacy Clause. In rejecting the preemption claim, we determined 
that Congress intended that the States be allowed, "to the extent consist-
ent with federal law, [to] regulate the employment of illegal aliens." 424 
U. S. , at 361. 
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doubt regarding the invalidity of the challenged portion of 
the University's in-state policy. 
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 
as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq., represents "a compre-
hensive and complete code covering all aspects of admission 
of aliens to this country, whether for business or pleasure, or 
as immigrants seeking to become permanent residents." 
Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U. S., at 664. The Act recognizes 
two basic classes of aliens, immigrant and nonimmigrant. 19 
With respect to the nonimmigrant class, the Act establishes 
various categories, the G-4 category among them. For 
many of these nonimmigrant categories, Congress has pre-
cluded the covered alien from establishing domicile in the 
United States. Id., at 665. 20 But significantly, Congress 
has allowed G-4 aliens-employees of various international 
organizations, and their immediate families-to enter the 
country on terms permitting the establishment of domicile in 
the United States. Id., at 666. In light of Congress' ex-
plicit decision not to bar G-4 aliens from acquiring domicile, 
the State's decision to deny "in-state" status to G-4 aliens, 
solely on account of the G-4 alien's federal immigration sta-
19 Immigrant aliens are subject to stricter qualitative tests than nonimmi-
grant aliens. See Harper, Immigration Laws of the United States 228 (3d 
ed. 1975). And whereas there are no quantitative restrictions on the ad-
mission of nonimmigrant aliens, there are, with a few exceptions, quota 
limitations for immigrant aliens. See 8 U. S. C. § 1151(a); Harper, supra, 
at 228. As we noted in Elkins v. Moreno: 
"Congress defined nonimmigrant classes to provide for the needs of inter-
national diplomacy, tourism, and commerce, each of which requires that 
aliens be admitted to the United States from time to time and all of which 
would be hampered if every alien entering the United States were subject 
to a quota and to the more strict entry conditions placed on immigrant 
aliens." 435 U. S., at 665. 
21) See, e.g., 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(15)(B) (temporary visitors for pleasure 
or business); id., § 1101(a)(15)(C) (aliens in transit); id., § 1101 (a)(15)(F) 
(foreign students); id., § 1101(a)(15)(H) (temporary workers). 
12 
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tus, surely amounts to an ancillary "burden not contemplated 
by Congress" in admitting these aliens to the United States. 
We need not rely, however, simply on Congress' decision to 
permit the G--4 alien to establish domicile in this country; the 
Federal Government has also taken the additional affirmative 
step of conferring special tax privileges on G--4 aliens. 
As a result of an array of treaties, international agree-
ments, and federal statutes, G--4 visaholders employed by the 
international organizations described in 8 U. S. C. 
§ 1101(a)(15)(G)(iv) are relieved of federal, and in many in-
stances, state and local taxes, on the salaries paid by the 
organizations. For example, the international agreements 
governing the international banks for which respondents' 
parents are employed specifically exempt respondents' par-
ents from all taxes on their organizational salaries. See Ar-
ticles of Agreement of the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development, Art. VII, § 9(b), 60 Stat. 
1440, T.I.A.S. No. 1502 (1945) ("No tax shall be levied on or 
in respect of salaries and emoluments paid by the Bank to ex-
ecutive directors, alternates, officials or employees of the 
Bank who are not local citizens, local subjects, or other local 
nationals."); Agreement Establishing the Inter-American 
Development Bank, Art. XI, § 9(b), 10 U. S. T. 3029, 
T.I.A.S. No. 4397 (1959) ("No tax shall be levied on or in re-
spect of salaries or emoluments paid by the Bank to . . . em-
ployees of the Bank who are not local citizens or other local 
nationals."). 21 Not only have some of the specific tax exemp-
21 Among the similar agreements pertaining to other international orga-
nizations are the following: Articles of Agreement of the International Fi-
nance Corporation, Art. VI,§ 9(b), 7 U.S.T. 2197, T.I.A.S. No. 3620 (1956) 
("No tax shall be levied on or in respect of salaries and emoluments paid by 
the Corporation to .. . employees of the Corporation who are not local citi-
zens, local subjects, or other local nationals."); Articles of Agreement of 
the International Development Association, Art. VIII , § 9(b), 11 U.S.T. 
2284, T.I.A.S. No. 4607 (1960) ("No tax shall be levied on or in respect of 
salaries and emoluments paid by the Association to . .. employees of the 
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tions contained in international agreements been incorpo-
rated into a federal statute, see 22 U. S. C. § 286(h), but the 
International Organizations Immunities Act has explicitly af-
forded a federal tax exemption for those G-4 visaholders em-
ployed by international organizations for which no treaty or 
international agreement has provided a tax exemption for 
foreign employees. 22 Section 4(b), 59 Stat. 670, 26 U. S. C. 
§ 893 ("Wages, fees, or salary of any employee [except citi-
zens of the United States and of the Republic of the Philip-
pines] of ... an international organization ... , received as 
compensation for official services to such . . . international 
organization shall not be included in gross income and shall be 
exempt from [federal] taxation."). 
In affording G-4 visaholders such tax exemption, the Fed-
eral Government has undoubtedly sought to benefit the em-
ploying international organizations by enabling them to pay 
salaries not encumbered by the full panoply of taxes, thereby 
lowering the organizations' costs. See 41 Op. Att. Gen'l 170, 
172-173 (1954). The tax benefits serve as an inducement for 
these organizations to locate significant operations in the 
United States. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 1203, 79th Cong., 
1st Sess., 2-3 (1945); S. Rep. No. 861, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 
2-3 (1945). By imposing on those G-4 aliens who are domi-
Association who are not local citizens, local subjects, or other local nation-
als."); Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between 
States and Nationals of Other States, Art. 24, § 2, 17 U.S. T. 1270, T.I.A.S. 
No. 6090 (1965) ("Except in the case of local nationals, no tax shall be levied 
. . . on or in respect of salaries, expense allowances or other emoluments 
paid by the Centre to officals or employees of the Secretariat."); Articles of 
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Art. IX, § 9(b), 60 Stat. 
1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501 (1945) ("No tax shall be levied on or in respect of 
salaries and emoluments paid by the Fund to . . . employees of the Fund 
who are not local citizens, local subjects, or other local nationals. ") . 
22 And by virtue of Md. Ann. Code, Art. 81, § 280(a), this group of G-4 





ciled in Maryland higher tuition and fees than are imposed on 
other domiciliaries of the State, the University's policy frus-
trates these federal policies. Petitioners' very argument in 
this Court only buttresses this conclusion. One of the 
grounds on which petitioners have sought to justify the dis-
criminatory burden imposed on the respondents is that the 
salaries their parents receive from the international banks for 
which they work are exempt from Maryland income tax. In-
deed, petitioners suggest that the "dollar differential ... at 
stake here [is] an amount roughly equivalent to the amount of 
state income tax an international bank parent is spared by 
treaty each year." Brief for Petitioners 23. But to the ex-
tent this is indeed a justification for the University's policy 
with respect to the respondents, it is an impermissible one: 
The State may not recoup indirectly from respondents' par-
ents taxes that the Federal Government has expressly 
barred the State from collecting. 23 
In sum, the Federal Government has not merely admitted 
G--4 aliens into the country; it has also permitted them to es-
tablish domicile and afforded significant tax exemptions on 
organizational salaries. In such circumstances, we cannot 
conclude that Congress ever contemplated that a State, in 
the operation of a university, might impose discriminatory 
tuition charges and fees solely on account of the federal immi-
gration classification. 24 We therefore conclude that insofar 
23 Petitioners point out that the international banks for which respond-
ents' parents work provide reimbursement for the difference between in-
state and out-of-state tuition. Certainly, this fact does not assist-but un-
dermines-petitioners' argument. Such reimbursements only add to the 
employment costs of the international organizations, thereby frustrating 
the federal intention of benefiting the international organizations. 
24 It is important to note, however, that this case does not involve a 
State's imposition of a burden on all individuals sharing a common relevant 
characteristic, of whom only some are aliens. Our cases do not suggest 
that where a lawfully admitted alien possesses a certain characteristic, he 
would be immune from the burden imposed on all who share that charac-
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as it bars domiciled G-4 aliens (and their dependents) from 
acquiring in-state status, the University's policy violates the 
Supremacy Clause. 
III 
Finally, we must address petitioners' contention that the 
Eleventh Amendment precluded the District Court from or-
dering the University to pay refunds to various class mem-
bers who would have obtained in-state status but for the stay 
of the District Court's original order of July 13, 1976. As pe-
titioners concede, in seeking a stay of that order the Univer-
sity made the representation to the District Court that in the 
event the 1976 order was "finally affirmed on appeal," it 
would make appropriate refunds. This representation was 
incorporated in the stay orders of both the District Court and 
Court of Appeals. It is petitioners' contention, however, 
that the .1976 order was "effectively" vacated when this 
Court, in Toll v. Moreno, supra, vacated the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the District Court 
for reconsideration. Petitioners therefore conclude that the 
terms of the University's waiver of sovereign immunity can 
no longer be satisfied. 
Petitioners' argument is not persuasive. We do not inter-
pret Toll as having vacated the judgment of the District 
Court. In Toll the Court recognized that the University had 
altered its position through the promulgation of the clarifying 
resolution, raising "new issues of constitutional law which 
should be addressed in the first instance by the District 
Court." 441 U. S., at 462. The Court declined, however, to 
decide whether the District Court, in issuing its 1976 order, 
had improperly relied on due process grounds, and whether 
continuation of the order was justified on equal protection or 
teristic. As such, this would be a wholly different case if, for example, as 
a matter of federal law, the G--4 alien could not establish domicile in the 
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preemption grounds. Thus, while we vacated "the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals," ibid., we left the judgment of the 
District Court undisturbed. 25 And contrary to petitioners' 
suggestion, a vacatur of the District Court's judgment was 
not necessary to give the District Court jurisdiction to recon-
sider the case. See Goldberg v. United States, 425 U. S. 94, 
111-112 (1976); Campbell v. United States, 365 U. S. 85, 
98-99 (1961); 28 U. S. C. § 2106 ("The Supreme Court ... 
may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judg-
ment . . . and may . . . require such further proceedings to 
be had as may be just under the circumstances."). 26 
IV 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
25 Petitioners note, however, that whereas the District Court's 1976 
order was based solely on due process grounds, the District Court, on re-
mand, held the in-state policy as it operated during the period following the 
clarifying resolution invalid on two different grounds-equal protection 
and preemption. In our view, this fact is of little moment. Just as a re-
spondent is entitled to defend in this Court a judgment on grounds differ-
ent from those relied on by the court below, e. g., C olautti v. Franklin, 439 
U. S. 379, 397, n. 16 (1979), respondents in this case were entitled, follow-
ing our remand, to support a reaffirmance of the earlier order on grounds 
previously urged but not relied on. 
26 Even if we were to assume that the judgment of the District Court was 
indeed vacated, we could not say that the terms of the University's waiver 
of sovereign immunity-that the District Court's order be "finally affirmed 
on appeal"-would not be satisfied. Petitioners have not prevailed on the 
merits in a single court, despite the numerous decisions that this litigation 
has prompted. By its original order, the District Court held that the Uni-
versity's in-state policy was invalid insofar as it discriminated against G-4 
aliens. Today, we reaffirm that conclusion. 
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